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Jurisdiction in respect of contract terminated following allegations of fraud (ICSID)

Practical Law UK Legal Update Case Report 9-504-8356 (Approx. 8 pages)

Jurisdiction in respect of contract terminated following allegations of fraud (ICSID)

by Iain Maxwell, Herbert Smith LLP
In Malicorp Ltd v The Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No ARB/08/18), an ICSID tribunal considered whether the claimant had made an "investment" for the purposes of ICSID jurisdiction, and whether allegations of bad faith should be considered at the jurisdiction or the merits phase.

Speedread

An ICSID tribunal considered whether a contract requiring the claimant to contribute substantial sums amounted to an "investment" in circumstances where the contract had been entered into but then terminated before any such contributions had been made. It held that the situation differed from cases in which no contract had been entered into, where pre-contractual expenses had been held not to amount to an investment. The tribunal concluded that the contract, which contemplated substantial expenditure and contributions by the claimant, amounted to an "investment" for the purposes of establishing ICSID jurisdiction.
The tribunal further considered whether allegations that the contract had been entered in bad faith affected the jurisdiction of the tribunal. While declining to provide any general guidance as to whether such issues should be characterised as jurisdictional in nature, the tribunal held that in the circumstances of the present case, it would be preferable to address the allegations at the merits phase. Having accepted jurisdiction, the tribunal went on to reject the claim on the merits without making any finding of fact with respect to the allegations of bad faith.
The award adds to the ongoing debate about whether investments made in bad faith fall within the scope of ICSID jurisdiction, and also contains helpful analysis of the circumstances in which a contract will amount to an investment when terminated at a very early stage. (Malicorp Ltd v The Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No ARB/08/18) (7 February 2011).)

Background

Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention provides:
"The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State … and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally."
In Salini Costruttori SpA v Morocco (ICSID Case No ARB/00/4), the tribunal identified criteria (Salini criteria) relevant to the determination of whether an investment exists for the purposes of Article 25. For such an investment to exist, there should generally be:
  • A contribution.
  • Of a certain duration.
  • Of a nature such as to generate returns.
  • Presenting a particular risk.
  • Such as to promote the economic development of the host country.
For further details on Article 25 generally, see Practice note, The definition of investment in international investment law.
Article 1(a) of the 1975 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments entered into by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the one hand, and Egypt on the other (BIT), provides that:
"'investment' means every kind of asset and in particular, though not exclusively, includes…:
(iii) claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value; …
(v) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources."
The BIT also imposed standards of treatment relating to fair and equitable treatment and expropriation (Articles 2 and 5).

Facts

Entry into and termination of the concession contract

Between August 1999 and February 2000 the claimant, Malicorp Ltd, took part in a tender process run by the Egyptian government (Government) for a concession to build and operate the Rus Sudr International Airport in Egypt.
In September 1999, Malicorp amended its Memorandum and Articles of Association, increasing its authorised share capital from £1,000 to £100 million However, it appears that no further capital was issued with Malicorp's issued capital remaining £1,000.
As part of the tender process, on 3 January 2000, Malicorp's representatives were called to a meeting with representatives of the Government in order to clarify certain aspects of its bid, in particular the company's structure and capital. What was said and what documents were provided at this meeting is disputed. The Government alleges that Malicorp held itself out as a company with capital of £100 million and submitted forged documents to this effect. Malicorp disputes what documents were provided and when, and asserts that there is a major difference between issued or subscribed capital, constituting the actual capital, and authorised capital, which is the amount up to which the board of directors may increase the capital without having to call an EGM.
In February 2000, Malicorp was selected as the preferred bidder, and on 4 November 2000 Malicorp and the Government entered into the concession contract.
In March 2000, Malicorp cancelled the resolution to increase its authorised share capital to £100 million, and replaced it with the original value of £1,000.
On 12 August 2001, the Government wrote to Malicorp, rescinding the contract on four bases, that Malicorp had:
  • As part of the tender process, submitted "doubtful papers", and had subsequently failed to provide the authentic and real documents.
  • Submitted "invalid papers" to the security department concerning the names of the partners in Malicorp.
  • In breach of the contract, failed to establish and found the required Egyptian project company by 3 February 2001 (together with other breaches of the contract).
  • Not been serious in executing the contract and, nine months later, had not started the project.

CRCICA arbitration and Egyptian criminal proceedings

On 20 April 2004, pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions in the contract, Malicorp filed a request for arbitration with the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) claiming damages for losses sustained due to the alleged wrongful termination of the contract. In parallel with the CRCICA arbitration proceedings, the Government brought criminal proceedings against a number of individuals directly or indirectly connected with Malicorp, including Egyptian civil servants involved in examining the bid, alleging various unlawful and fraudulent acts. The Government applied to the CRCICA tribunal for a stay of the arbitration proceedings in view of the criminal proceedings. The CRCICA tribunal refused the stay and the CRCICA arbitration proceedings continued.
On 19 February 2006, the Council of State Administrative Court of Cairo held that the arbitration clause contained in the contract was void and ordered the CRCICA tribunal to suspend the arbitration proceedings. As a result, one member of the tribunal suspended his participation in the proceedings. The remainder of the CRCICA tribunal however went ahead with the proceedings, relying on Egyptian Arbitration Law, and on 7 March 2006 issued an arbitral award (CRCICA award).
The CRCICA award found the arbitration clause binding but found that the Government had been the victim of a fundamental error in signing the contract in that it had wrongly believed that the capital registered and paid by Malicorp was £100 million and for that reason the contract was void. The CRCICA tribunal nevertheless ordered the Government to reimburse Malicorp for costs, invoices and salaries of its employees in the sum of US$14,773,497, with interest. The Government has alleged that in doing so the CRCICA tribunal relied on a provision of Egyptian Civil Code to which the parties had made no reference during the proceedings, and has applied to have the CRCICA Award set aside, an application which is pending.
Malicorp sought to enforce the CRCICA award in France. However, on 19 June 2008 the Paris Court of Appeal dismissed Malicorp's application to enforce the CRCICA award, finding that the tribunal's issuing of the award on the basis of a provision that had not been previously submitted to the parties amounted to a denial of justice. This decision was upheld by the French Cour de Cassation, which considered that the tribunal had violated the adversarial principle by basing its decision on provisions of the Egyptian Civil Code that had not been pleaded by the parties.

The ICSID proceedings

On 21 October 2008, Malicorp filed its Request for Arbitration with ICSID pursuant to the BIT. In the ICSID proceedings, Malicorp alleged that:
  • The Government wrongly terminated the contract.
  • By doing so it breached the BIT.
  • Consequently, it was entitled to compensation from the Government for the losses it had suffered.
The Government challenged the tribunal's jurisdiction on the basis that the contract had been entered into as a result of fraud and the ICSID tribunal therefore had no jurisdiction, as the Government's consent to arbitration under the BIT did not extend to fraud.

Decision

The tribunal concluded that it did have jurisdiction pursuant to the BIT and the ICSID Convention.
However, it went to on hold that the reasons on which the Government relied in terminating the contract were serious and adequate, that the termination was justified in fact and law, and that it could not therefore be interpreted as an expropriatory measure under the BIT. As a result, Malicorp's claim failed on the merits.

Jurisdiction

Although the Government had focused its jurisdiction challenge on the alleged fraud, without discussing the other conditions on which the tribunal's jurisdiction depended, the tribunal concluded it must satisfy itself that all the conditions were in fact fulfilled. It therefore looked at all the requirements under the BIT and Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, before focusing in particular on the requirement that the dispute relate to an "investment", and the impact of the allegations of bad faith.

Investment

The tribunal referred to the "double keyhole approach", requiring the alleged investment to qualify as such under both Article 1(a) of the BIT and Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. The tribunal noted that the two definitions do not seem to overlap, as they come from two different, but complementary, perspectives. The BIT's definition emphasises the fruits and assets resulting from the investment, which must be protected. By contrast, the criteria generally applied in relation to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention (such as the Salini criteria) stress instead the contributions that have created such fruits and assets:
"It can be inferred from this that assets cannot be protected unless they result from contributions, and contributions will not be protected unless they have actually produced the assets of which the investor claims to have been deprived."
In the present case, Malicorp had satisfied Article 1(a) of the BIT by establishing the existence of "assets", in particular "claims" or "any performance under contract having a financial value" (Article 1(a)(iii)), as well as claiming it had been deprived of a business concession (Article 1(a)(v)).
With regard to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, the tribunal agreed with previous decisions to the effect that costs incurred during negotiations with a view to concluding a contract do not constitute an investment if the state ultimately refuses to enter into the contract. However, it considered that the situation here was different, as the concession contract had been signed, and although Malicorp had not performed many services under it, the fact that the contract had been concluded implied major contributions in the future, and this was sufficient. The tribunal concluded that:
"… the protection [of the ICSID Convention and the BIT] extends to deprivation of the revenue the investor had a right to expect in consideration for contributions that it had not yet made, but which it had contractually committed to make subsequently."

The alleged breach of the principle of good faith

The tribunal confirmed that the safeguarding of good faith is one of the fundamental principles of international law and the law of investments. It considered that good faith issues can arise in two contexts:
  • The first is where investment protection is requested "in conditions" which are contrary to the principle of good faith; in other words, where a party has artificially created the conditions for protection. The tribunal, referring to Cemetownia v Turkey (ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/06/2) and Phoenix Action v Czech Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/06/5), gave the example of a party using stratagems to give the impression that it has acquired or is acquiring the nationality of a contracting country, with the sole aim of benefiting from the protection offered by a treaty. The tribunal felt that the protection offered by investment treaties could not extend to such cases, where the defect would not only undermine the rights of the investor on the merits, but also, a priori, his right to an arbitration of the dispute. The tribunal however concluded that this was not such a case.
  • The second is where protection is requested "for an investment" alleged to have been made under conditions contrary to the principle of good faith (for example, where the investment was the result of corruption), or had been obtained by deception or fraud, which was essentially what the Government was alleging in this case.
The tribunal noted that while some previous tribunals had approached this as a jurisdictional issue, in other words that the state's consent to arbitration of investment disputes presupposed that those investments were validly made, others have approached it as an issue on the merits.
The tribunal did not think it appropriate to provide a general answer to this question, but decided on the present case there were strong arguments that favoured treating the issue of the validity of the investment at the merits stage. Among the factors that the tribunal relied on were:
  • The principle of autonomy: only those defects going specifically to the consent to arbitrate itself (in this case given in the BIT), rather than defects impacting on the validity of the contract as a whole, can deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction.
  • The possible grounds for invalidity of an investment are extremely numerous and varied, and all could in theory be encompassed by the notion that the consent of the state applies only to valid investments. It was hard to find a basis for drawing a line to determine how and at what point each should be examined: something particularly pertinent in the case in question, where the parties' opinions differed on whether or not the contract was entered into as a result of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake.
  • The factual analysis of these issues often requires an in-depth examination. Where the nature and value of the investment are in large part verified through the same process of inquiry, it is preferable to examine and deal with all aspects at the same time.
For these reasons, the tribunal concluded that the issue of whether the concession contract had been entered into in good faith and the validity of the investment should be considered as part of the merits stage, not as part of the examination of jurisdiction and, having already concluded that the contract constituted an investment, concluded it had jurisdiction to consider the dispute.

The merits

As to the merits, Malicorp argued that the Government had breached BIT obligations relating to fair and equitable treatment (Article 2) and expropriation (Article 5). The tribunal noted that expropriation necessarily implies treatment that is neither fair nor equitable. The tribunal considered that where an investor bases its action primarily on expropriation, in order to rely on both provisions the investor must be able to establish that it has also been the victim of other measures, different from the expropriation.
Malicorp's sole complaint concerned the rescission of the concession contract. Nowhere in its pleadings did it explain in what way it was also the victim of unfair or inequitable treatment that gave rise to additional consequences. The tribunal therefore concentrated on the allegation of expropriation.
The tribunal examined the reasons set out in the Government's letter rescinding the contract, as listed above. Malicorp argued that these were merely pretexts, and that the real reason for the termination was a change of government policy. The tribunal, however, concluded that if the Government had a legitimate right to terminate the contract, it could do so, even if that indirectly suited its change of policy. The first question was therefore whether the reasons given in the respondent's letter justified the termination.
The first reason relied on in the letter was the Government's allegation that it had been misled by the submission of inaccurate documents concerning Malicorp's financial capabilities, at the heart of which was the distinction between authorised and issued share capital. On the facts, the tribunal, without making any finding on whether Malicorp was guilty of fraud or bad faith, found that "the nature and content of the information supplied to the Respondent by Malicorp's representatives was such as to give rise to an essential mistake" as to whether the company awarded the project was an empty shell or a company of substantial resources. The tribunal concluded that the mistake was sufficiently fundamental that it entitled the Government to terminate the contract, and therefore that the termination, justified in fact and law, could not be interpreted as an expropriation.
Malicorp's claim therefore failed at the merits phase.

Comment

The past few years have seen a number of investment treaty claims where respondent states have alleged bad faith on the part of investors. Although the tribunal in this case did not ultimately need to reach a finding on whether Malicorp had acted in bad faith, their discussion on the appropriate stage in the proceedings for such an issue to be addressed, and the factors that should be taken into consideration in deciding the appropriate stage, is one that will be of interest to parties in future cases where allegations of bad faith are made.
End of Document
Resource ID 9-504-8356
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Published on 16-Feb-2011
Resource Type Legal update: case report
Jurisdictions
  • International
  • United States
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