This is a chapter from the Bloomsbury Professional book Courting Publicity: Twitter and Television Cameras in Court, which is an essential and up-to-date guide on the use of social media and technology in court. It examines the impact of Twitter and television cameras on the justice system and looks at the debate between media interests and third party rights. The author provides a definitive analysis of "super injunctions" and the effect of maximum publicity on court proceedings.
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Table of Contents
3.1 Twitter has invaded society as well as the Internet. The erudite Stephen Fry is not the only public figure to have (temporarily) met his match when dealing with Twitter. It poses issues and difficulties for all of us, apart from the novelty it provides. Recently a US Congressman had to resign over a scandal allegedly involving his posting of intimate personal images on Twitter. There is concern that it is part of an increasingly technological invasion of personal privacy. It also impacts in many new ways on the litigation process. Will specifically tailored regulations be ultimately required?
3.2 Liberal Democrat MP John Hemming named Ryan Giggs in the House of Commons on 23 May 2011 as the plaintiff in a so-called super-injunction case. His name had until then been protected by the injunction. It signalled that we have truly entered a brave new world of unique technological concerns for privacy, litigants and the judicial process. It also raises important issues in terms of the constitutional interface and mutual respect between parliament and the courts.
3.3 John Hemming stated that: 'Mr Speaker, with about 75,000 people having named Ryan Giggs on Twitter, it is impractical to imprison them all.' He was using, or some might say abusing, parliamentary privilege to discuss something which otherwise might arguably amount to a defamation or a contempt of court.
3.4 Prime Minister David Cameron also stated on television on the same day that the continuance of super-injunctions was 'unsustainable.' He also suggested that the law be examined by a review committee. There may, therefore, be a political imperative to deal with these issues in a legislative manner. The exact nature of such regulation as yet remains to be set out.
3.5 Separately, a newspaper in Scotland, the Sunday Herald, printed a large picture of Ryan Giggs on 22 May 2011 with a thin black band over his eyes. He was clearly identifiable and recognisable to readers. One suspects that was the intention. It appears that the newspaper felt entitled to do so, taking the view that the English super-injunction did not apply to or extend to the separate legal jurisdiction of Scotland. However, it is unclear whether the journalist or the newspaper has any contact with the English jurisdiction, such as, for example, a legal employment contract or assets.
3.6 David Cameron indicated that he felt the judges in the super-injunction cases were making new law, and that this was something reserved for Parliament. He also stated that it was unfair for traditional press newspapers to be treated differently than new social media. As to what legal amendment or new law he envisages will only be revealed in time.
3.7 In separate hearings in the Julian Assange case, District Judge Riddle was in favour of twittering in court while Mr Justice Ouseley was not. Judge Riddle allowed tweets in the first bail hearing at the City of Westminster Magistrates Court. Justice Ouseley later refused such access in the second bail hearing at the High Court.
3.8 Liberal Democrat peer Lord Stoneham also used the House of Lords parliamentary rules and privilege to name Sir Fred Goodwin as having obtained an injunction order to prevent his name being published in relation to a story about a sexual relationship. Tugendhat J lifted the injunction preventing his name being published. The injunction was partly based upon privacy protection principles.
3.9 However, Mr Justice Eady refused a media application to refuse the continuance of an injunction, despite the Twitter publicity, reportedly saying that the 'court's duty remains to try and protect the claimant, and particularly his family, from intrusion and harassment so long as it can.'
3.10 Apparently, Attorney-General Dominic Grieve is also reported as being unhappy with the use (or abuse) of parliamentary privilege to circumvent Twitter injunctions. It remains to be seen what political or legislative actions may ensue. Indeed, there may be a need to consider whether it was envisaged that the parliamentary rules were to be used in a situation such as this. Some might argue that there may be a need to clarify the rules from a parliamentary perspective. This is quite apart from any need to regulate Twitter in court.
3.11 Jurors play an important role in the criminal, and sometimes civil, justice system. In carrying out their role they must abide by rules and ethical guidelines providing that they are impartial and undertake their deliberations only on the evidence presented before them in court. However, the advent of social networking websites such as Twitter and Facebook pose new threats with jurors breaching their obligations and the impartiality and fairness of the justice system. There are increasing examples of juror breaches.
3.12 When cases are abandoned, or re-trials ordered as a consequence, there are significant additional costs to society in terms of wasted costs, time and new hearings.
3.13 The legal and constitutional rights of defendants to a fair and impartial trial hearing are also at stake. In the US this is referred to in the Sixth Amendment due process provisions. Fair trial obligations are equally issues here.
'any private communications, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is […] deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties.'
3.15 There are a number of jury problems which can arise. Examples include juror use of social networking; undertaking internet research and tweeting from court, the jury room or indeed from home while still serving on the jury. These can all amount to juror misconduct. The role and the oath taken by a juror cannot be infringed. They cannot disclose details about the case which should not be public, nor disclose confidential jury deliberation information or pass improper information to other jurors. The errant juror, in undertaking their own research, may find out information, or histories, that they are not permitted to know, such as past criminal convictions.
3.16 Due to the increasing amount of Internet-related misconduct involving jurors, there have been calls to take additional steps to combat the problem, such as new rules, Internet-specific rules, explaining to jurors what the mischiefs are and the reasons for the rules, increased education, staggered warnings, and even penalties for errant jurors. It has been argued that 'the traditional rules meant to prevent juror misconduct are no longer sufficient in the [i]nternet age.' 'Within the jury system, the [i]nternet and its vast resources of instant information can wreak havoc.' The 'advent of the [i]nternet and its ability to provide an incredible amount of information quickly and easily, has ended the days of simply instructing a jury to avoid reading news stories.'
3.17 There are increasing efforts and examples of texting and tweeting from courts in the US; one example is the case of a man on trial for killing his wife in Greeley, Colorado, and another is a tax fraud case in Iowa. In both of these instances, the 'reporting' entity was apparently a traditional newspaper, namely The Tribune and Cedar Rapids Gazette. In addition, it is noted that the practice of courts permitting Twitter in court is 'not yet widespread.'
3.18 In one US case nine jury members were separately using the Internet to research the case, the parties (including the lawyers), as well as matters excluded by court direction. A mistrial was granted.
3.19 One juror who hoped to move deliberations along looked up definitions of manslaughter, murder and self-defence. If this was not bad enough, the search results were for the laws of another state. Worse still, this resulted in the second mistrial in the case.
3.20 A 2007 case reversed a burglary conviction on appeal, after the jury foreman discussed the case in his blog online, including details about the defendant, other jurors and the jury discussions.
3.21 In 2009, a juror researched details of a psychological illness referred to by one of the expert witnesses, and discussed the results of the research with other jurors.
3.23 A murder conviction was overturned in 2009 by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals after jurors were consulting definitions on Wikipedia in relation to blood forensics and time of death forensics. A separate manslaughter conviction was also overturned in 2009 after online juror misconduct.
3.24 One court tried to remedy the situation by removing a juror who carried out research on the parties, the possible sentences and who had also announced this information to other jurors. The appeal court disagreed, saying that the whole jury was therefore tainted.
3.25 In another case, a juror researched the case online, looking at factual distance issues, and whether the defendant had been involved in previous cases, and announced this to other jury members.
3.26 Senator Fumo in 2009 also appealed a conviction on the grounds that one of the jurors was posting statements about the case on Facebook. In a separate case, a juror posting on Twitter advised readers not to buy the shares of the defendant as there was an adverse decision pending.
3.27 Jurors have been known to research crime scene issues, and this is not possible without leaving the court, or leaving the juror's home. Jurors (and witnesses) in live (or pending cases) can now use Google Maps and Google Streetview to look at case locations.
'[a]lthough the Internet has made information accessible for the average person, the information obtained thereby may be misleading, taken out of context, outdated, or simply inaccurate […] In view of the problems and dangers associated with the unsupervised use of the Internet, trial courts should emphasize that jurors should not consult the Internet, or any other extraneous materials, at any time during the trial, including during deliberations.'
3.29 The Media Law Resource Centre in the US has published a guide model policy in relation to the use of electronic devices in courtrooms. This is reported as being a lobbying effort to persuade judges to accept greater electronic in-court reporting.
3.30 One potential juror in the US posted pictures of other potential jurors to his Twitter page. Frank Wilson in another instance also blogged about a case he was a juror in, including criticisms of the judge and defendant. In another instance a juror contacted a witness by friend request on Facebook. A trial juror in the criminal case of Fumo was posting contact updates of the case on Facebook and Twitter.
3.31 A mistrial was granted where jurors were variously researching the case, legal definitions, lawyer and party histories and excluded evidence online in one case.
3.32 A retrial was granted where a juror found out through Internet research that the defendant had a previous conviction for sex crimes, and announced this to other jurors.
3.33 There is already at lest once instance of juror misuse in the UK. A jury member was posting confidential details of the case on their Facebook account page. The case related to a child abduction and sex assault case.
3.34 The juror in question requested people to post on her page as to how she should vote in the jury poll in the case. The trial ultimately continued without her, and while potentially she had committed a contempt of court, this avenue was not pursued.
3.35 In a study which found that juries often fail to understand jury instruction, it was also found that jurors often carry out internet research of the case, amounting to contempt of court.
3.36 There is also a recent decision where a juror was convicted of content and sentenced to eight months' imprisonment in England and Wales. The errant juror had sent a number of Facebook messages to one of the defendants in the case she was a jury member on.
3.37 Courts in various jurisdictions are beginning to recognise the problems posed by juror misconduct in the Internet age. There are increasingly calls for rules established to try and deal with, or to at least ameliorate, such misbehaviour.
3.38 The 2008 Juries Act in Australia was enacted to address these problems, and may be used to prosecute a juror who undertook online research during a trial in 2009.
3.39 There are rules setting out warning to jurors in Connecticut and Michigan. California, Maryland, Wisconsin and other US states are amending their juror instructions. Various jurisdictions within states have also now updated juror instructions, such as San Francisco, San Diego Superior Courts and Rhode Island. Individual judges have also been known to tailor their own specific jury instructions in relation to the Internet, social networking and mobile technology. There does not appear to be any general research on the specific instructions in the UK.
3.40 The US Federal Courts Judicial Conference issued instructions to be read to all federal juries in January 2010.
3.41 On occasion a juror may be removed from the case. In one instance, a juror who started researching the earnings of the defendant company was removed. The juror was then charged with contempt of court.
3.42 It is more difficult for the traditional tools, namely a warning beforehand, and dealing with incidents as they arise, to be efficient and effective. Whether greater research is needed, there may be a case for a more specific and tailored legislation.
3.43 Are new or more specific rules needed to address Twitter, Facebook and social networking in court? What additional technological issues need to be addressed? One example of the latter may be jurors carrying out Internet research and searches. This might be a juror researching legal or medical definitions, or looking at a crime scene on Google Earth or StreetView.
3.44 Judge Dennis M. Sweeney (retired) provided a guide model admonition for the jury at the jury selection/jury venire stage, then a further admonition to be used during breaks in the trial, and a final guide written instruction to jurors prior to jury deliberation on the verdict.
3.45 Rules enacted in Alabama prohibit 'broadcasting from the courtroom' which might include Twitter reporting. Mobile telephones and laptops which have photographic and recording capabilities may only be used by lawyers, but without taking photographs or making recordings.
3.46 Missouri provides that all electronic devices including 'laptop computers, handheld PCs (Personal Digital Assistants such as Palm, Pocket PC), and cellular phones' must be turned off in court.
3.47 The rules in Pennsylvania aim to be future-proofed and also explicitly refer to juries. Electronic devices are defined as 'those devices (both currently available as well as future technology) that have their primary function wireless communication, the storage and retrieval of digitized data, and computer applications.' The use of electronic devices is forbidden in court. 'Juries in possession of electronic devices will surrender these devices to court staff prior to entering the jury room to commence deliberations. Grand jurors in possession of electronic devices will surrender these devices to court staff prior to entering the Grand Jury room.'
'… education and continued publicity to this topic are the keys to decreasing ethical violations and other professional sanctions. The importance of this topic is also why it may be necessary to add supplementary material to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Additionally, attorneys should not only monitor their own online activities, but remind their clients that their online activities may be monitored by judges or opposing counsel which could result in adverse consequences. Social media may provide new and novel ways to communicate, but the same ethics rules still apply.'
3.49 'YouTube, and other video sharing websites cause many changes for the Fourth Amendment right assuring jury purity.' Social networking 'supplements' if not replaces traditional news sources. However, this is often without traditional regulations. Social networking content does not have controls and procedures to check accuracy.
3.50 'While all jurisdictions have […] pre-trial instructions, many of them must improve their language and detail to reflect the challenges presented by twenty-first-century technology.' The traditional methods for dealing with the problems via jury instructions in advance of trial are 'obsolete.' This would appear to be the case in the UK also.
3.51 Some jurisdictions are attempting to be clear and explicit in their warnings, explicitly naming technologies such as Facebook, Twitter, Google. One example is New York. Some have wondered whether providing written instructions to jurors would assist.
3.52 However, it has been said that the various opinions in relation to judicial use of social media are not uniform. Could jury instructions in relation to Twitter and social networking actually confuse the jury? Research is also needed on a cross-jurisdictional basis. The issues presented by the use of Twitter in court are not faced by the UK alone.
3.54 However, revising jury instructions on their own may not be sufficient, unless the reason for the new rules are properly explained. This should be borne in mind in any UK consideration. Rules without education may be blunt instruments.
3.55 In addition, penalties for errant jurors may be required also. Jurors in New York who stray can be punished under contempt of court rules, as provided in New York Judiciary Law 753(A)(6).
3.56 A juror guide available from DirectGov indicates to prospective jurors that the 'must not discuss the trial on websites like Facebook or Twitter.' It adds that,
'You must not disclose or discuss any of the conversations, statements or opinions discussed in a jury deliberation room with anyone outside of your jury either face to face, over the telephone or over the internet via social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter or MySpace. These conversations are private to you and your fellow jurors and cannot be disclosed or discussed with anyone, including family and friends.'
There may also be benefit in explaining that these restrictions are as an alternative to juror sequestration.
3.57 In terms of the UK (England and Wales in particular) there are a number of areas that need to be considered in terms of existing recommendations that can be considered and that may been to be retooled to catered for social networking. Examples are referred to on the Guidance website provided by the Judiciary of England and Wales and Tribunals Judiciary. We may need to consider the 'Reporting Restrictions in Criminal Courts' (21 March 2011); 'Consultation on Live, Text-Based Communications from Court' (7 February 2011); 'The Guide to Judicial Conduct' (9 April 2008); 'The Responsibilities of Justices' Clerks to the Magistracy and the Discharge of Their Judicial Functions, Guidance by Lord Justice Leveson: Senior Presiding Judge for England & Wales' (23 October 2007); and 'Conduct of Justices' Clerks and Assistant Justices' Clerks' (23 October 2007).
taking mobile devices off jurors prior to entering the courtroom;
updating the instructions given to juries;
questions being put to jurors regarding their Internet use (but potential privacy issue may arise);
sanctions such as contempt of court being imposed when a juror is found in breach; and
jurors monitoring and reporting on each other in the event of suspected breach.
3.59 In any consideration of introducing Twitter in court (and indeed television cameras), it is suggested that we need to consider the party rights, including defendant rights. Frequently this discussion ignores the extent to which parties have an interest in relation to what happens outside the court, including the reporting of their case. What interest or rights do they have in relation to normal levels of publicity and the maximum amount of publicity? This issue is relatively unexplored.
3.60 It is well recognised in the UK that defendants have a right to a fair trial (often then balanced against the principle of open justice).
3.61 In the US the Sixth Amendment guarantees an individual's right to a fair trial. It is a fundamental right constitutionally guaranteed. Individuals have a right to an impartial jury and a jury making deliberations solely based upon evidence presented and tested at trial. Case law also recognises that pre-trial prejudice can be presumptive as well as actual. There is what is known as a 'presumptive prejudice doctrine.' In the US, possibly the leading pre-trial media publicity case is Sheppard v Maxwell.
3.62 This issue is only now coming to be considered and its full nuances will take some time to be fully appreciated. Already there have been political as well as legal concerns raised. It appears inevitable that more court rules and protocols and potentially legislation will have to be introduced. The process appears to have commenced with consultations and initial reports.
 See L N Zimmerman, 'Twitter Invades the Internet,' 78 Journal of Kansas Bar Asscociation (2009) 15; P Gragg and C L Sellera, 'Twitter,' 102 Law Lib J (2010) 325.
 See E Pilkington, 'Anthony Weiner Resigns Over Twitter Photo Scandal', Guardian, 16 June 2011; M Egan, 'Congressman Weiner Quits in Lewd Photo Scandal', Reuters, 16 June 2011.
 L McCoy, '140 Characters or Less: Maintaining Privacy and Publicity in the Age of Social Networking' 21 Marq Sports L Rev (2010) 203.
 A C Payne, 'Twitigation: Old Rules in a New World' 49 Washburn L J (2010) 841. Also M D Baker, and S S Pearlman, 'Tweet Threats' 14 AALL Spectrum (2009) 18.
 G Rayner, 'Ryan Giggs Named as Premier League Footballer in Gagging Order Row' Telegraph, 23 May 2011, available at www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8531175/Ryan-Giggs-named-as-Premier-League-footballer-in-gagging-order-row.html (last accessed 1 August 2011).
 See B Thanki et al, The Law of Privilege, (Oxford University Press, 2006); McNicol, Law of Privilege, (The Law Book Company, 1992).
 M Evans, 'David Cameron: Twitter Gossip Makes Super-injunctions Unsustainable and Unfair' Telegraph 23 May 2011, available at www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8530203/David-Cameron-Twitter-gossip-makes-super-injunctions-unsustainable-and-unfair.html (last accessed 1 August 2011).
 'Privacy Case Footballer "Named"', Irish Times, 23 May 2011.
 On ITV1's Daybreak. Reported in 'David Cameron: Twitter Gossip Makes Super-injunctions Unsustainable and Unfair' Telegraph, 23 May 2010.
 C Gordon, 'Judge Lifts Media Ban on Top Banker's Affair', Irish Independent, 20 May 2011.
 This is reported as being lifted on 19 May 2011. Ibid. However, the injunction was allowed to remain in place in relation to the woman allegedly involved. Ibid.
 'MP Names Giggs in Injunction Controversy', Irish Times, 24 May 2011.
 'MP Names Giggs in Injunction Controversy', Irish Times, 24 May 2011.
 A McGee, 'Juror Misconduct in the Twenty First Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms', 30 Loy L A Ent L Rev (2010) 301-326, at 302.
 Ibid, at 303.
 Remmer v US, 347 US 227, 229 (1954), referred to in A McGee above, at 304.
 T J Fallon, 'Mistrial in 140 Characters or Less? How the Internet and Social Networking are Undermining the American Jury System and What Can Be Done to Fix It', 38 Hofstra L Rev (2010) 935-969.
 Ibid at 937.
 Ibid at 938.
 S Butterworth, 'Can Live-Blogs and Twitter Take Court Reporting into the 21st Century?', the Guardian, available at www.guardian.co.uk/law/afua-hirsch-law-blog/2010/jul/28/live-blogging-tweeting-court-reporting (last accessed on 1 August 2011).
 Referred to in J G Browning, 'The Online Juror,' 93 Judicature (2009-2010) 231, at 232.
 Case of Destie B Ventre (2004), referred to in J G Browning, above, at 232.
 The case of Donald McNeely, referred to in J G Browning above, at 232.
 Zarsine Wardlow v State of Maryland, Special Court of Appeals, referred to in J G Browning above, at 232.
 The case of Sheila Dixon, referred to in J G Browning above, at 232.
 Alan Jake Clark, referred to in J G Browning above, at 232.
 Referred to in J G Browning above, at 233.
 State of New Jersey v Justin Scott et al, referred to in J G Browning above, at 233.
 Referred to in J G Browning above, at 233.
 R Vaidyanathan, '"Twittering" Threat to US Trials', BBC, 17 March 2009, available at news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7948845.stm (last accessed 1 August 2011).
 R Vaidyanathan, above.
 A McGee, 'Juror Misconduct in the Twenty First Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms', 30 Loy L A Ent L Rev 30 (2010) 301-326, at 305, and 316.
 Colorado Court of Appeals (2003), referred to in J G Browning above, at 233.
 S Butterworth, above.
 The case of Al Roker, referred to in T J Fallon above, at 940.
 Ibid at 944.
 K Kerr, 'Juror Admits Error', Newsday, 31 July 2009 at A5, referred to in T J Fallon above, at 941.
 J Schwartx, 'As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are Popping Up', New York Times, 18 March 2009, at A1, referred to in T J Fallon above, at 942.
 Referred to in T J Fallon above, at 943.
 Referred to in T J Fallon above, at 967.
 U Khan, 'Juror Dismissed From a Trial After using Facebook to Help Make a Decision' Telegraph, 24 November, 2008, available at http://telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/lawreports/3510926/Juror-dismissed-from-a-trial-after-using-Facebook-tp-help-make-a-decision.html Referred to in A McGee, 'Juror Misconduct in the Twenty First Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms', 30 Loy L A Ent L Rev (2010) 301-326, at 309.
 A Hough, 'Jurors "Fail to Understand Judges" Instruction" Study of 69,000 Verdicts Find' Telegraph, 17 February 2010; D Casciani, 'Jurors Struggle to Understand Judges, Says Major Study', BBC, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8519138.stm (last accessed on 1 August 2011).
 J Deans, 'Facebook Juror Failed for Eight Months', Guardian, 16 June 2011. Also, 'Facebook Contempt Case: Juror Jailed for Eight Months', Telegraph, 16 June 2011.
 Referred to in J G Browning, 'The Online Juror', 93 Judicature (2009-2010) 231, at 234.
 Referred to in J G Browning above, at 234.
 Referred to in J G Browning above, at 233-234.
 Ibid, at 234.
 Ibid. In relation to jury instructions generally in criminal matter, note, for example, Model Jury Instructions in Criminal Matters (Canadian Judicial Council, 2004); and J Wood, 'Jury Directions,' 16 Journal of Judicial Administration (2007) 151.
 Moore v American Family Mutual Insurance Company 576 F 3d 781, 787 (8th Cir 2009); referred to in T J Fallon above, at 948.
 Ibid, see pp 945-946.
 D M Sweeney, 'Worlds Collide: The Digital Native Enters the Jury Box', Reynolds Courts & Media L J, (2011) 1(2) 121, at 137.
 Ibid, at 141.
 Photography, Broadcasting, Recording and Electronic Devices, Civil Misc No 3046, Order, In the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Alabama, 6 October 2009, at 1.
 Ibid, at 2.
 United States District Court Eastern District of Missouri, In Re: Business of the Court, Electronic Device Policy, General Order, 10 October 2003.
 United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, In Re: Possession and use of Electronic Devices in Courthouses, Electronic Device Policy, Effective June 1, 2005, Standing Order No 05-3, 29 April 2005, at 1.
 Ibid, para 2.
 Ibid, para 5, at 2.
 A O'Brien, ibid, at 540.
 M Mastromauro, 'Pre-Trial Prejudice 2.0: How YouTube Generated News Coverage is Set to Complicate the Concepts of Pre Trial Prejudice Doctrine and Endanger Sixth Amendment Fait Trial Rights,' 10(2) Journal of High Technology Law (2010) 289, at 292.
 Ibid, at 201.
 T J Fallon, above, at 953.
 T J Fallon, above, at 954.
 See references at T J Fallon, above, at 956.
 It states 'In this age of instant electronic communications and research, I want to emphasize that in addition to not conversing face to face with anyone about the case, you must not communicate with anyone about the case by any other means, including by telephone, text messages, email, internet chat or chat rooms, blogs, or social websites, such as Facebook, MySpace or Twitter.' Comm on Criminal Jury Instruction, Office of the Court Administrator, Criminal Jury Instructions 2D: Jury Admonitions in Preliminary Instructions (2009), www.nycourts.gov/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Jury_Admonitions.pdf (last accessed 7 August 2011) referred to in T J Fallon, above, at 956-957.
 A O'Brien, 'Are Attorneys and Judges One Tweet, Blog or Friend Request Away From Facing a Disciplinary Committee?' 11 Loy J Pub Int L (2010) 511 at 537.
 Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions (2009), referred to in T J Fallon above, at 960-961.
 Michigan Court Rules 2.511 (H)(2)(c). See T J Fallon above, at 962.
 T J Fallon above, at 958.
 Referred to in T J Fallon above, at 960.
 Jury Sevice – What Happens in Court and After the Trial (DirectGov).
 T J Fallon above, at 966.
 A McGee, 'Juror Misconduct in the Twenty First Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms' 30 Loy L A Ent L Rev (2010)(30), 301-326, at 315-326.
 See, for example, R Clayton and H Tomlinson, Fair Trial Rights, (Oxford University Press, 2010).
 M Mastromauro above, at 201.
 Ibid, at 293, referring to: 'Dobbert v Florida, 432 US 282, 288 (1977) (discussing actual prejudice shown if juror sitting at trial cannot set aside prejudice); Murphy v Florida, 421 US 794, 797 (1975) (stating that because jurors could not reasonably set aside prejudice to sit at trial a change of venue was proper); Sheppard, 383 US at 340 (holding jurors could not set aside prejudice before sitting at trial); Dowd, 366 US at 727 (noting that voir dire of jurors determines whether juror can set aside prejudice); Foley v Parker, 488 F 3d 377, 383 (6th Cir 2007) (discussing that even in heavily publicized cases, juror's assertion of ability to set aside prejudice offers adequate protection); United States v Campa, 459 F 3d 1121, 1125 (11th Cir 2006) (stating that the defendant received fair trial because jurors all answered that they could set aside prejudice); DeLisle v Rivers, 161 F 3d 370, 377 (6th Cir 1998); United States v Rasco, 123 F 3d 222, 226 (5th Cir 1997) (reasoning that there is no need for juror to be a blank slate at trial only that juror may set aside possible bias),' n 18, p 293.
 Ibid, at 295.
 384 US 333 (1966), referred to ibid, at 296-299. However, note Mu'Min v Virginia 500 US 415, 420 (1991), referred to ibid, at 302.